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ment of attorney's fees because it was acting in good faith
in refusing to release the mortgage. But we need not decide
whether "good faith" in refusing to release is a defense in an action brought under Sec. 78-3-8 R. S.
12
U. 1933. The evidence in the record indicates that
appellant refused to advance money under the contract in an
attempt to force payment on another contract. And appellant offered to release the mortgage only if reimbursed
for its expenditures although by its own act it had breached
the contract and made it impossible for respondent to proceed. Appellant failed to establish that it acted in "good
faith" in refusing to release the mortgage.
A party who contracts to lend money to another to build
a house, taking a mortgage thereon as security, observes
the other party expend money and time and perform as
agreed, yet refuses for reasons of coercion connected with
another matter to advance money as agreed, can
hardly insist that he acted in entire good faith and
13
should therefore be protected from payment of certain
damages.
Judgment affirmed. Costs to respondents.
MOFFAT, C. J., and LARSON, McDONOUGH, and
PRATT, JJ. concur.

SHIELDS v. UTAH LIGHT ft TRACTION CO.
No. 6157. Decide September 18. 1940. (105 P. 2d Ml.)
1.

In death action, the reading of a
long and involved complaint to jury as part of the charge constituted prejudicial error which waa not altogether corrected by instruction that the complaint was not to be construed as evidence
but merely aa Betting forth claims of plaintiff. Rev, St 1933, §§
67-7-10, 57-7-28(2, 3), 67-7-29, 67-7-81, 104-14-7, 104-39-3.
APPEAL AND ERKOR. TRIAL.

SL APPEAL AND ERBOE. THIAL. In death action where deceased at
time of death was earning $77.60 per month, instruction setting
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forth plaintiffs theory that deceased would have soon been earning $200 per month constituted prejudicial error where no evidence was offered to support such allegation. Rev. St. 1933, §§
104-14-7, 104-39-3.1
8. AITKAJL AND ERROR. In death action arising out of intersection
collision, an instruction setting forth in full applicable city ordinances and state statutes constituted prejudicial error, where
trial court failed to caution jury that such laws merely #et forth
plaintiff's claim, and where plaintiffs complaint contained the
only verbatim copy of any law, and in a subsequent instruction
jury were directed to look elsewhere in the instructions for certain
laws relating to motor vehicle traffic. Rev. St. 1933, §§ 104-14-7,
104-39-3.2
4. DEATH. In death action, evidence of remarriage of plaintiff, surviving mother of deceased, at a time subsequent to accident but
before tibial, was not admissible on damage issue, but jury was
entitled to consider on such issue physical and mental condition
of beneficiaries of deceased at time of his death. Rev. St. 1933, §§
104-3-11, 104-41 3.*
WOLFE, J., dissenting in part.

Appeal from District Court, Third District, Salt Lake
County; Roger L McDonough, Judge.
Action by Millie Shields against the Utah Light & Traction Company, a corporation, to recover for death of
plaintiff's son in a traffic accident. From a judgment for
the plaintiff, the defendant appeals and plaintiff filed
a cross-appeal.
Reversed, and new trial granted.
Hougaard, Shields & Shields, of Salt Lake City, fa?
appellant.
*Smith v. Columbus Bu#gy Co., 40 Utah 580, 123 P. 680; SUA*
Bank of Beaver v. Hollingshead, 82 Utah 416, 25 P. 2d 612.
*Loofborrow v. Utah Light & Railway Co., 31 Utah 355, 88 P. 19;
Povit V. Heiner, 54 Utah 428, 181 P. 587.
^English v. Southern Poo. Co., 13 Utah 407, 45 P. 47, 35 L. E. K
155, 57 Am. St. Rep. 772; Evan$ V. Oregon S. L. R. Co., 37 Utah 431,
108 P. 638, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 259; Fritz v. Western Union Tel <>•,
25 Utah 263, 71 P. 209.
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Bagley, Jtidd, Ray & Nebeker, of Salt Lake City, for
respondent.
JONES, District Judge.
This is an appeal from a money judgment in a damage
action resulting from a traffic accident which caused death.
The accident took place on one of the main thoroughfares of Salt Lake City. The hour was 6:30 a. m., the
weather fair, the streets dry, and only the two vehicles
which collided were in the vicinity. The deceased was traveling west on his motorcycle at about 30 or 35 miles per
hour. The bus was moving eastward at approximately 15
miles per hour. Both vehicles approached a semaphore controlled intersection showing "go" at about the same moment.
The collision took place over on the north half of the street
while the bus was executing a left turn. Respondent's
theory was that the bus was cutting the corner, did not
have the right of way, no signal was given, it was going too
fast, and was not being operated under proper control.
Appellant disputed these contentions and alleged that the
deceased was guilty of contributory negligence.
In instructing the jury the trial court included therein
substantial copies of the pleadings of the parties. Instruction number one which set forth the allegations of the complaint occupies more than ten printed pages of the abstract.
Sub-paragraphs four and five of this instruction (being the
identical portions of the complaint) read as follows:
"(4) That at all times herein mentioned there were in full force
•md effect in Salt lake City, Utah, certain ordinance*, as fallows,
to wit:
"Sec 1872. Vehicle Turning Left lit Intersection, (c) The driver
of a vehicle within an intersection intending: to turn to the left shall
yield to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction, which
is within the intersection, or BO clow thereto, as to constitute an immediate hazard, but j&aid driver having to yielded and having given a
signal when and as required by law, may make such left turn, and
other vehicle* approaching the intersection from said opposite direction shall yield to the driver making the left torn.
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"Sac 1374 (as amended May 3, 1936).
"(2) A signal of intention to turn right or left shall be given continuously during not less than the last one hundred feet traveled by
the vehicle before turning.
"(5A) Left hand turn arm extended horizontally.
"Sec 1370. The driver of a vehicle intending to make a left turn
ahall turn as near as possible to the right of the center of the street
upon which he is proceeding where the same crosses the crosswalk and
into the intersection, and to proceed so as to enter the street into
'which he is turning as nearly as possible to the right of the center of
the same where it passes the crosswalk and enters the intersection.
41

(6) That at all times mentioned in said complaint there was likewise in full force and effect Revised Statutes of Utah 1933r which contained the following sections, to wit:
"Eight Of Way 57-7-31. At Intersections.

•

•

•

"The driver of a vehicle within an intersection intending to turn to
the loft *hall yield to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which is within the intersection or so close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard, but such driver having so yielded and
karing given a signal when and as required by law may make such
left turn, and other vehicles approaching the intersection from tha
opposite direction shall yield to the driver making the left turn.
"57-7-28. Turning at Intersections.

*

•

•

"(2) Approach for a left turn shall he made in the lane for traffic
to the right of and nearest to the center line of the highway, and 3eft
turn shall be made by passing to the right of such center line wbars
it enters the intersection and upon leaving the intersection by passing to the right of the center line of the highway then entered.
U

(S) Approach for a left turn from a two-way street into a cna^r&y street shall be made in the lane for traffic to the right of a&d
nearest to the center line of the highway and by passing to the rigfol
$f such center line where it enters the intersection.
"57-7-29. Departure from Direct Line of Travel—Signals.
"The driver of any vehicle upon a highway before starting, stopping
or tunning from & direct line ahall first see that nuch movement &M
be rr^de in safety, and, if any pedestrian may be affected by sut&
movement, shall give a clearly audible signal by Bounding the hoTO
and whenever the operation of any other vehicle may be affected bj
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such movement shall give a signal aa required in this section plainly
visible to the driver of such other vehicle of the intention to make
such movement.
"The signal herein required shall be given either by means of the
hand and arm in the manner herein specified, or by an approved
mechanical or electrical signal device, except that when a vehicle is
so constructed or loaded as to prevent the hand and arm signal from
being visible both to the front and rear the signal shall be given by a
device of a tyj>e which has been approved by the state road commission.
<f

Whenever the signal is given by meanB of the hand and arm the
driver Bhall indicate his intention to start, stop or turn by extending
the hand and arm horizontally from and beyond the left side of the
vehicle," (Thia section was amended by chap. 48, Session LAWS 1935.)

Instruction number four is as follows:
"The foregoing instructions are not to be considered by the jury as
a statement on the part of the court of the facts as proved in this
case, but simply as a recital of what the plaintiff and defendant respectively claim to be the facts. Where it is stated that a party admits certain facts, you are to take such facts as established and
proved, beyond this you are not to draw any conclusions as to the
facts from a mere recital of the claims of the respective parties as
hereinbefore set forth. It is aolely and exclusively for the jury to
find and determine the facta, and this they must do from the evidence, and having done so the jury must then apply to the facts the law
as set out in these instructions,**

The first paragraphs of instructions numbered ten,
eleven and twelve are as follows (the last paragraphs of
these instructions make specific applications of the propositions set forth fa the first paragraphs) ;
"Number 10. You are instructed that it Is provided by the laws of
the State of Utah that the driver of a vehicle within an intersection intending to turn to the left shall yield to any vehicle approaching
from the opposite direction which is within the intersection, or so
close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard.
"Number 11. You are instructed that it i% provided by tha laws at
the State of Utah that no person shall turn a vehicle from a direct
course upon a highway unless and until such movement can be made
with reasonable safety and then only after giving an appropriate elg^
tial, and that a signal of the intention to turn to the left shall b* giv«n
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continuously during not less than the last 100 feet traveled by the
Tfchkle before turning; that when a left hand turn is about to be
made the signal sh#]l be given by the hand and arm extended hori*oot»lly or by a signal lamp or signal device of a type approved by
the state road commission, but when a vehicle is so constructed or
loaded that a hand and arm signal would not be visible both to the
front and rear of such vehicle then said signal must be given by such
lamp or device.
"Number 12. You are instructed that it is provided by the laws of
the State of Utah that the driver of a vehicle intending to turn at
an intersection shall do as follows: Approach for a left turn shall be
made in the lane of traffic to the right of and nearest to the center
line of the highway, and the left turn shall be made by passing to
the right of such center line where it enters the intersection, and on
leaving the intersection by passing to the right of the center line of
the highway then entered."

From the foregoing is will be observed that while the
court cautioned the jury that "the foregoing instructions
[referring to the pleadings] are not to be considered by the
jury as a statement on the part of the court of the facte
&s proved in this case, but simply as a recital of what tho
plaintiff and defendant respectively claim to be the facts/?
j%t in1 a following instruction the attention of the jury i&
Specifically directed back to the only quoted copy of certain
statutes and ordinances which appears in instruction one,
ijx the following language:
\ ""Elsewhere in these instructions certain laws relative to motor v&*
hide traffic are s*t Jorth" e t c

From this point of view the jury is told that the fo$U
going "merely set forth the claims of the parties as to tha^
fm&Bn but that this same instruction contains the la^£
Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the plaintiff b^
copying into her complaint certain sections of our statute
(with the hope, no doubt, that the trial judge would include
the same in the instructions relating to the pleadings) has
keen able to secure, in effect, an emphasis upon certalit
propositions of law as against others which are entitle?
to equal .weight On this theory respondent caused portions
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of the city ordinances to be read to the jury as well as
certain identical sections of the statute in addition to having
the court (further on in the instructions) repeat these laws
in substance together with an explanation of just how
these propositions were to be applied to the facts. The
reiteration of given propositions to the jury in the instructions does not have judicial approval: 1 Blashfield on
Instructions to Juries, § 108; 2 Bancrofts Code Practice,
1145; Randall's Instructions to Juries, § 416; Alaska Steamship Co. v. Pacific Coast Gypsum Co., 78 Wash. 247, 138 P.
875; Schroeder v. Lodge, 92 Neb. 650 139 N. W. 221, Ann.
Cas. 1914B, 1173; Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co. V.
Alexander, 47 Wash. 131, 91 P. 626; Kahl v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paid Ry. Co., 125 111. App. 294; Munsey v.
Marnet Oil & Gas Co., Tex. Civ. App., 199 S. W. 686, 687.
There is one other matter in connection with the reading
of the pleadings to the jury as part of the instructions
which might be mentioned here. In sub-paragraph 9 of
instruction one the jury is advised (by way of setting forth
just what plaintiff contended' the facts showed) that at
the time of the death of the deceased (as a result of the
accident in question) he was an "employee of the Tooele
Valley Railway Company in Salt Lake City, Utah, and was
earning a salary of $77.50 a month, and was promised by
said employer, and upon such promise it is therefore alleged that his salary would rapidlyincrease until he would
be earning approximately $200.00 per month/' Appellant
makes the point that there is no testimony in the record to
sustain the last phrase of the &boVe quotation. Respondent
concedes that there is no testimony as to the exact amount
of the possible raise in salary but points to the statement
of one of the officers of the Tooele Valley Railway Company
to the effect that the deceased's opportunity for advancement in pay and position was "very good/' This being true
the trial court should have deleted the reference to the
$200 item from the instruction, for, in setting forth the
claims of the parties to the jury, only that portion of the
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pleadings on which evidence had been introduced, should
be mentioned at all, although the reading of the pleadings
to the jury is generally condemned. Randall's Instructions
to Juries, § 404; Hammer v. Liberty Baking Company, 220
Iowa 229, 260 N. W. 720; In re Thompson's Estate, 211
Iowa, 935, 234 N. W. 841; WeUon V. Iowa State Highway
Commission 211 Iowa 625, 233 N. W. 876, 877; Smith V.
Columbus Buggy Co., 40 Utah 580, 123 P. 580.
Respondent tacitly admits that a verbatim reading of the
pleadings to the jury as a part of the instructions is not
the best procedure but insists that prejudicial error has
not been committed when one considers the entire charge
of the trial court together with Sections 104-14-7, 104-39-3,
R. S. U. 1933, as construed by this court in Loofborrow v.
Utah Light & Railway Co., 81 Utah 355, 88 P. 19; and in
Davis V. Heiner, 54 Utah 428, 181 P. 587. Quotations from
the separate opinions of Justices Gideon and Thurman
appear in the briefs as to just what the holding of this
;ourt was in the latter case. Under such circumstances the
lecision of the court should be ascertainable by reading the
jylabus. See Sec 26, Article VIII, Constitution of Utah.
Applicable point determined by the headnotes of this case
•ead as follows:
"2. Appeal and Error—Harmless Error—Statute. Under direct
nrovisions of Comp. Laws 1917, §§ $622 and 6968, Supreme Court will
tot reverse judgment except for prejudicial error." (The above are
tow identified as sections 104-14-7, and 104-89-8, R. S. U. 1988 r*pectlvely).
"$. Trial—Instruction.*—Sufficiency. ) Trial court should concisely
fcate issues to jury, and not merely read the pleading* verbatim.
i

i

"7. Appeal and Error—Harmless Error—Instructions. Trial court'*
rror in simply reading pleading* to jury, and not concisely stating
&ues in his own language, held not prejudicial, where issues were
imple, and substantially all allegations in both complaint and angrer were controverted."

The issues in thi3 case were not Bimple in any reaped
ppellant was charged with having caused the death of
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the motorcyclist in several particulars as heretofore outlined. Appellant denied responsibility for the accident and
set up by way of contributory negligence that the deceased
did not have his motorcycle under control, did not maintain
proper lookout, and crossed into said intersection at a speed,
which was not reduced, of S6 miles per hour.
The jury was twice informed (instruction one, paragraph
four and Instruction eleven) that a driver intending to turn
left at a semaphore controlled intersection must give the
signal for such turn continuously during not less than the
last one hundred feet traveled by the vehicle before commencing to turn. (For the purpose of the retrial this reference to this subject should not be construed as an approval
of the instruction as correctly stating the law). Three times
was the jury reminded that at a semaphore controlled intersection a driver intending to turn to the left shall yield to
any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which
is within the intersection, or so close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazzard. (See Instruction one, subparagraph four' and five and Instruction ten.) Aside from the
subject of undue emphasis these instructions may not correctly set forth the law. (See Sec 67-7-10 R. S. U. 1933,
Chap. 48 p. 117, Session Laws 1935.) Two limes was the
jury's attention directed to the law on just where and
when a left turn on a highway should be executed, (See
Instruction one subparagraph five and Instruction twelve.)
We conclude that the reading of the long and involved
complaint to the jury as part of the charge was error not
altogether corrected by the mere admonition that the foregoing is not to be construed as evidence but merely sete
forth the claims of the plaintiff, likewise, the setting
forth of plaintiff's theory in Instruction one, that the 1-8
deceased would have soon been earning ?200 per
month was error for the reason that there was no evidence
offered to support such allegation. See State Bank of Beaver
V. HoUingshead, 82 Utah 416, 25 P- 2d 612. The setting
forth in haec verba of applicable city ordinances and state
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statutes in the Instruction relating to the pleadings was
error especially when it is considered that not only did the
trial court fail to caution the jury that such laws merely
®et forth plaintiff's claim but in a subsequent instruction
the jury were directed to look elsewhere "in these instructions for certain laws relating to motor vehicle traffic"
When plaintiff's complaint contained the only verbatim
copy of any law in the entire charge. And the resulting
emphasis on applicable laws favorable to plaintiff's side
as the result of the continual reference and repeating of
certain law propositions resulted in the unbalancing of
the charge and error.
So, weighing and considering these several errors together in the light of our statute (Sees. 104-14-7 and 10489*8 R. S. U. 1933), the conclusion must be reached that
appellant's substantial rights were in fact affected and
prejudiced in a material manner.
Having determined that the action must be retried, it
now becomes necessary to discuss certain other law ques^
tfcns which will arise on the new trial. (Sec. 104-41-8 R.
S. V. 1933.)
%1
^ftke parties differ as to whether the remarriage of t$<?
plaintiff, the surviving mother of the deceased, at a tim$
Subsequent to the accident but before the trial should be
permitted to go before the jury as bearing upon the damag^
issue. Appellant maintains that such evidence should
^•permitted to go before the jury while respondent
fiimsts that the t'emarriage is immaterial because the
damages should be measured as of the moment of death"
5*here is a conflict among the authorities on this proposition. The rule generally followed is that the pecuniary \o&$
ho the beneficiaries is to be based upon conditions as thej
existed at the time of the death complained of. See note &1
80 A. L. R. 121; Simoneau V. Pacific Electric R. Co., 16?
CaL 264, 136 P. 644, 49 L. R. A., N. S., 737; Davis V. Guafr
fcfen, 46 Ohio St. 470, 15 N. E. 850, 4 Am. St. Rep. 54g
Swift & Co. v. Foster, 183 111. 60, 44 N. E. 837; St. Louk
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J. M. & S. if. Co., v. Cleere, 76 Ark. 377, 88 S. W. 995; Cor^
solidated Stone Co. v. Morgan, 160 Ind. 241, 68 N. E. 696;
Boswell V. Barnhart, 96 Ga. 521, 23 S. E. 414; Beaumont
Traction Co. v. Dilworth, Tex. Civ, App., 94 S. W. 352.
The minority rule holds that evidence is admissible covering a change for the better In the financial status of the
beneficiary subsequent to the time of death. Francis V. Atchinon, T. & S. F. R. Co., 113 Tex. 202, 253 S. W. 819, 30
A. L. R. 114, 119; Davis V. Wight, Tex. Civ. App. 218 S. W.
26.
In Francis V. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., supra, it was
held, upon the question of the amount of damages to be
awarded parents for the wrongful death of an adult son,
that evidence was admissible showing subsequent to death,
said parents had become the recipients of an income through
a policy on insurance on the life of another son. Such a
holding in and of itself points out the salient weakness of
this rule for, if evidence of a change in the financial condition of a beneficiary for the better occurring subsequent
to death but before trial is admissible, reason would require
that likewise evidence of the bidden poverty or misfortune
of the statutory party after the time of death and before
the trial should be received. So, ultimately and finally
the question becomes as to whether in this jurisdiction the
damage should be measured as of the moment of death or,
for all practical purposes, the day of the trial. We feel that
the! fairest w&y'tb ascertain "sucll'damages * * * as under
all the circumstances of the case may be just*' (Sec. 1048-11 R. S. U. 1933) is to limit the inquiry on this issue to
the moment of death. In so holding 'we do not in any Way
change the previous determination of this court to the
effect that the physical and mental condition of the beneficiaries in an action for wrongful death should be considered by the jury in estimating the damages including
particularly the age, health, and other similar circumstances
(Evans V. Oregon S. L. R. Co., 37 Utah 431,108 P. 638, Ann.
Cas. 1912C, 259; English V. Southern Pac. Co., 13 Utah 407,
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45 P. 47, 85 L. R. A. 155, 57 Ann. S t Rep., 772) except td
now announce that such evidence should relate to the time of
death.
The age and probable length of life of the deceased as of
the moment of death is a relevant fact to be considered
in estimating the amount of pecuniary loss caused by the
death to the beneficiary to the action. See L. R. A. 1918E,
280 and other cases therein cited; 26 A. L. R. 595 and
cases therein cited; 7 A. L, R. 1341 and cases therein cited;
and see English V Southern Pac. Co., supra. The disposition
of the deceased toward aiding or supporting the beneficiary
during his lifetime may be shown. And in connection with
this disposition the affection or the absence thereof and the
aid actually given may be shown. See Evans v. Oregon
S. L. R. Co., supra. And should it be made to appear that
the disposition of the deceased was such that he would
reasonably have continued to render services and help his
mother after obtaining his majority then damages may ba
claimed for such prospective help that the deceased might
have been given during the life of the beneficiary even though
during that period he might be under no legal obligatio^
to so help. Bond V. United R. Co.f 159 Cal. 270, 113 P. 36$,
48 L. R. A., N. S., 687, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 60; State v. Cohe^
166 Md. 682,172 A. 274, 94 A. L. R. 247; Stejskal v. Darrovf^
55 N. D. 606, 215 N. W. 83, 53 A. L. R. 1096; Franklin t
South Eastern Ry., 3 Hurl. & Nor. 211, 157 Eng. Rep. 44^
6 Eng. Rul. Cas. 419, and see annotation in 53 A. L. ^
1102, 1103.
<> In concluding this discussion it should be remarked tfeM
the mere fact that the deceased was single and might m
some time marry is too remote to be given consideration
as a separate issue. Fritz v. Western Union Tel. Co., 25 Utai
263, 71 P. 209, send see L. # . A. 1918E, 282. This being thi
correct rule, it would likewise be improper to receive evj;
donee bearing on the mere possibility of the remar^"^ 3 * 1
the surviving beneficiary. See 30 A. L. R. 124.
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There is one other matter. This appeal and the trial
below waa had with the respondent appearing by her former
name. Prior to the next trial she should ask leave to substitute her present legal surname (Tate) for the former
one used at the time the complaint was filed (Shields).
Should the plaintiff seasonably neglect to take this step
the defendant is to have the privilege of forcing this change
by motion for, when a woman marries, the law confers on
her the surname of the husband. Brown V. Rdnke, 159
Minn. 458, 199 N. W. 235, 35 A. L. R. 413, and see annotation at 35 A. L. R. 417.
The action is accordingly reversed and a new trial
granted. Costs to appellant
MOFFAT, Chief Justice.
I concur in the result
LARSON, Justice. I concur.
PRATT, Justice.
I concur in the result
WOLFE, Justice (concurring in part, dissenting in part) •
[4] The measure of the damages is the loss of the probable contributions which deceased might have made toward
support of respondent had he lived. This is to be measured
as of the time the cause of action arose—at the time of the
death due to negligence. But the difficult question is
whether, in determining the probability of contributions
as of that time, subsequent events which occurred up to
the time of trial and which may throw light on that probability may be introduced. I think not If the measure of
damage is the loss of contributions commuted as of the time
of death, we must consider the matter as if the jury had
tfied the case as of the time of death. The argument that
any evidence of events occurring between the death and
the trial which would tend to reduce th$ speculative element
in the probability factor should be admitted is alluring
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but specious. The doer of the negligence should not benefit
by another's windfall nor respond because of another's'
misfortunes unconnected with his negligence. While th#
judgment is to compensate for a loss and not to penalize
for carelessness, the very principle that the defendant should
not benefit because of good fortune, fortuitous so far &s"«
it is concerned, nor be mulcted because of misfortune not*
related to its acts, requires that as of the time of the death1
we measure the then commuted value of the loss of probable*
contributions. This rule is born of its practicality. Otherwise a widow might owe the defendant money if it caused
the death of a poor and undesirable husband thus giving
her the enviable opportunity of consummating marriage
with a rich and more desirable spouse. And where the
death resulted in payment to the plaintiff of life Insurance
money which she otherwise would not have obtained, coiiid
the doer of the negligence argue that the death had actually
befcfcfite<l b&r more th&n &ny living c&ntrib\itk>tt v*\nt,h sh%
might expect? Appellant cannot claim the result of a
benefit which may have ensued from its own wrong not
can it any the more take advantage of a betterment whidl
came about subsequent to but not consequent on the deaftl*
it caused. The loss becomes fixed at the time of deaiS^
for at that time the probable contributor was removed. •$
therefore, concur in the conclusion that the probable valp$
of the loss of contributions commuted as of the time <$?
death does not permit evidence of good or bad fortune #|§
"flowing proximately from defendant's negligence to./^£|
Introduced in order to throw light on the probability QI
contributions. The probability is as it existed at the $aw
of death and not as it might change with subsequent ev^pl^
^. But I cannot concur in the conclusion that the reiterate
of the ordinances and laws relating to duties of person
driving vehicles on the street was prejudicial. Those laws
and ordinances touched the rights and duties of both &&
ceased and defendant. If this "placed the emphasis upb$9
certain propositions of law as against others entitled 1*1
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equal weight" the propositions so emphasized were statutes
specifying the rights and duties of both parties on the
street. It was not a case of emphasizing the duties of the
traction company and playing down the duties of the deceased or playing up his rights in relation to the defendant.
If reiterated a dozen times it simply stated the statutory
law governing both parties on the streets. It is not good
practice to set out the claims of the parties pro haec verba
as contained in their pleadings instead of condensing them
in the court's own language, but to do so is not necessarily
prejudicial.
Stating to the jury a claim as contained in the pleading
when there was no evidence to support it is a more serious
transgression, but in this case I think it could not have been
prejudicial in view of the fact that the court notified the
jury that the language of the pleadings was not evidence
but only the claim as made by the plaintiff. Since there
was no evidence to substantiate it and no instruction relating
to it, we must assume that the jury did not consider it as
evidence and did not take it into consideration. I think
the judgment should be affirmed. %
I call attention to the implication in the opinion that
because Section 26, Article VIII of the Constitution requires
this court to prepare a syllabus of all points adjudicated in
each case which shall be concurred in by a majority of the
judges, the syllabus is paramount over the language of the
prevailing opinion. Where there is an ambiguity in the
opinion- ths syllabus may be resorted to in clearing it up
but where the syllabus and context are contradictory, I
think we must still resort to the language of the opinion
and not Hie syllabus aa controlling. I .must therefore emphatically dissent from portions ot th* opinion as indicated
in rtxy discussion.
TtfcDONOUGH, J., being disqualified, did not participate
herein.
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